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Current scholarship on corporate governance has largely ignored
the gender effect of corporate decisions, particularly as capital moves
outward into global markets.  This article represents a tentative ef-
fort at analysing corporate governance utilizing a law and econom-
ics and feminist analysis.  Through the lens of gender, it examines
the continued legacy of the shareholder wealth maximization norm
and the myth of value neutrality in the nexus of contractual rela-
tions conception of the corporation.  It assesses the normative un-
derpinnings of efficiency norms and suggests that there is a need
for a shift in the current governance paradigm to take account of
gender.  This can be accomplished by beginning to account for and
capture the values and costs attributable to the generation of surplus
value for the corporation and by according the appropriate control
rights in recognition of such investments.
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At a recent film festival screening in Toronto, Canada, my daughter
Samantha, aged 21, was the director.  When she was introduced to the audi-
ence of several hundred, she dedicated the film to her mother, because, in her
words: “my mother always taught me that I could do anything, or be any-
thing, that I choose.”  Needless to say, I felt unbelievably touched as a mother.
She is my first of three children, very much her own person, feminist, artist,
theorist, and caregiver.  Yet in this special moment, I could not help but note
that while women have come a long way in terms of economic and social
choices, it is but a few frames in the footage that will play out before there is
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full equality.  It is unlikely that a film that discusses gender inequality as
historical artefact will be made in my lifetime.  A few months later, as if
scripted, the multinational corporation that owns the television network where
she was an Associate Producer cancelled her news and current affairs pro-
gram on gays and lesbians.  The rationale was profitability, that the network
could use reruns of the program and meet its broadcast licensing require-
ments while putting its resources to more immediately profitable programs.
The decision to maximize short-term return to investors resulted in the loss
of numerous jobs and the loss of an important alternative source of human
rights news for the public.  This type of corporate decision is played out
daily in the sense that corporate decisions to maximize shareholder wealth
do not fully take account of other costs, benefits, and investments in
corporate activity.
As a corporate law scholar, I have rarely discussed issues of gender and
corporate law.  My feminism clearly informs my scholarship, as does my
law and economics background.  Yet the failure to articulate the gender
effects of corporate law may itself be a function of the place of feminism in
the hierarchy of economic and corporate law theory.  This article represents
a tentative effort to put some thoughts on paper.  It works within the existing
framework of market economies and thus, by definition, is a narrow project.
Corporate governance includes both the internal governance mechanisms
of the corporation and the broader public regulatory framework in which
corporations operate.  Governance is the mechanism whereby decisions are
made to cost-effectively raise and utilize capital in the efficient generation of
wealth, and by which corporate officers are held accountable to those invest-
ing in the firm.2  Governance also includes the relationship of corporate
decision makers with the broader community in which the corporation
operates, in respect of issues such as environmental impact or local economic
activity.  The governance debates of the past decade have revolved pri-
marily around contractarian and communitarian approaches, with “socio-
economics” more recently drawing from both of these theoretical approaches.
The reader is well advised to consult the wealth of literature on all of these
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE460
approaches, however, for the purpose of this article, their willingness or
failure to make visible the particular situation of women is highlighted.
In the continuing proliferation of corporate law literature, scholars are
occupied with convergence theory, optimal governance principles, the role
of corporate norms, and the cross-cultural domestic influences on corporate
governance.  This debate has received even more attention with the recent
failures of Enron and other publicly traded companies and resultant losses to
investors, workers and creditors.  At the heart of these debates are several
underlying themes: the continued legacy of the shareholder wealth maximi-
zation norm; normative conceptions of efficiency; and issues of control and
accountability by corporate decision makers.  Within these debates, one
aspect that receives little attention is how corporate governance fails to
account for women.
To briefly set a context, convergence theory suggests that there will be
functional or formal convergence of corporate governance norms due to
global capital market pressure.  A countervailing approach path dependence
theory suggests that governance is shaped by pressure from the diverse
economic, social, and political systems in which corporations operate, and
thus complete convergence is unlikely.  Both approaches have to date failed
to explicitly acknowledge where women are situated within the corporation.
Most theoretical approaches to corporate governance are modelled on strong
historical notions of property and thus on a particular distribution of eco-
nomic power that is highly gendered within the marketplace.  They generally
fail to articulate and value the experiences and contributions of women to the
economic and social life of corporations, and thus the distributive effects of
various governance models.
This article will highlight some of the problems within corporate gover-
nance.  However, it is a preliminary attempt to do so, and further empirical
and theoretical consideration of the issues and a greater exchange of ideas is
required.  In this respect, this project is but a modest beginning.
Part II of this article examines the continued legacy of the shareholder
wealth maximization model through the lens of gender.  In particular, it
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examines the myth of value neutrality in contractual relations and suggests
that there be a recasting of corporate objectives to one of enterprise wealth
maximization.  There is a need for a specific feminist voice in the corporate
governance discourse and this part explores some of the feminist corporate
law scholarship that has emerged in recent years.  Part III then examines
gendered notions of efficiency, assessing their normative underpinnings in
terms of how one measures costs, benefits and investments in the corpora-
tion.  Different theoretical approaches offer a wealth of analytical tools in
designing optimal governance practice.  Part IV suggests that there needs to
be a shift in the current paradigm to take account of gender in the corporate
boardroom, the workplace, and in our collective consciousness.  By develop-
ing a notion of corporate governance that takes account of multiple invest-
ments in the firm, applying both law and economics and feminist insights,
one can begin to articulate a model that more accurately measures costs in
the generation of surplus value for the corporation, and articulates a vision
of corporate governance that begins to redress some of the current inequi-
table distributional trends in corporate law.  Part V examines accountability
by corporate decision makers with a look at boardroom demographics, cross-
cultural implications of corporate decision making and a brief discussion of
the treatment of gender in other corporate governance regimes.
II. GENDER AND THE CONTINUED LEGACY OF THE SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH MAXIMIZATION NORM
The Anglo-American discourse in corporate law has been dominated by a
shareholder rights paradigm.  As a result, women as workers, small credi-
tors, mothers, and small investors are largely ignored.  While enhanced share-
holder rights are an important aspect of international governance regimes,
the narrow focus of the debate fails to fully explore other key issues raised
by divergent capital markets and their governance structures.  An important
step in this exploration is to challenge the apparent neutrality of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm of corporate governance and
expose its normative content.  Once this normative content is evident, the
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE462
debate becomes a matter of justifying one’s normative choices rather than
trying to justify interference in the operations of a “neutral” to “inject”
feminist values.
A.  Contractarian Theory, Historical Gender Privilege, and Value
Neutrality
The dominant Anglo-American corporate law scholarship of the past
decade has been a nexus of contractual relations approach to corporate
governance.  Contractarian theorists generally argue that contracts are the
mechanism by which stakeholders, those having both implicit and explicit
contracts with the corporation and its managers, exercise control over
managers in order to protect their interests, including bargaining risk pre-
miums and other mechanisms to control agency costs.3  This reasoning
suggests that corporate directors should be accountable exclusively to share-
holders because they are least able to bargain complete contracts to protect
their interests, and as the sole residual claimants to the corporation’s assets
after all debts are satisfied, shareholders have the greatest incentive to moni-
tor corporate decision making.  To require corporate officers to account to
any other stakeholder would, according to these scholars, result in mana-
gerial shirking or opportunism from a lack of accountability.4  Workers and
other creditors are allegedly able to bargain complete contracts to protect
their interests or, it is claimed, public law in the form of employment
standards and credit enforcement systems will protect their interests.
The nexus of contractual relations approach has failed to explore the
gender implications of this normative view of corporate governance.  Capital
is largely concentrated in the hands of men as a result of powerful historical,
cultural, economic, and political norms regarding the ability of women to
hold property, the value of women’s labour, their unequal status as married
and unpropertied women, and the caregiving role of women within the
family (broadly defined) and in society.  The contractarian model reinforces
pre-existing notions of ownership and thus the imbalance in property rela-
tions between men and women.  When contractarians express concerns about
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the distributional effects of decisions to intervene in governance matters in
the interests of multiple stakeholders, rather than “allowing the market to
operate freely,” they are opposed to redistributional efforts to correct histori-
cal imbalances in wealth and power between men and women.  Similarly, the
shifting of any control rights to workers or tempering existing fiduciary obli-
gations of directors are resisted as having distributional effects.  This does
not acknowledge that existing governance systems continue to shift value to
property owners and hence primarily to men.  A shareholder wealth maximi-
zation paradigm thus has distributional consequences that are made invisible
using a purely contractarian analysis.
Another operating assumption of contractarians is that corporations are
free to externalize numerous costs of decisions that create market efficien-
cies for the corporation, but may harm employees, communities and public
welfare.5  Contractarian theory suggests that any harmful effects of corpo-
rate decisions should be left to public law or private contracting, that it is not
a function of the corporation to take these costs into account in determining
shareholder wealth maximization.6  Yet when externalized costs harm share-
holders and creditors, as seen with Enron and other recent corporate failures,
there is swift regulatory response to restore investor confidence in the capital
market.7 Similar harms from violation of human rights, tort or environ-
mental standards, or norms do not result in the same kinds of immediate
public policy responses, although arguably, these also involve serious costs
to productive corporate activity.  Repositioning of corporate activity in
global capital markets is also highly gendered.  An example is the rapid and
pervasive growth in contingent and secondary labour markets, in which work-
ers, particularly women of colour and immigrant women, are exploited with-
out adequate compensation, basic employment protections or job security.8
Contractarian theory suggests that these costs do not need to be accounted
for by the firm, yet they provide a direct monetary benefit in that the firm
can take advantage of these cost savings in competitive labour markets.
Yet with the move to global capital markets, the concomitant dismantling
of social safety nets, imposition of work for welfare programs, and attack on
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employment standards and labour relations legislation has left workers,
particularly those at the bottom of the wage scale, vulnerable to exploitation
by corporate employers.9  These trends are highly linked.  The failure of
public law to address these costs flows directly from the efforts of those who
have the resources to lobby and financially support legislators who make the
public policy choices on resources and social welfare or labour adjustment
programs.  The quantum of financial contributions by corporations to major
political parties is evidence of this.10  Moreover, the need of many countries
to attract multinational corporations to their jurisdictions means that the host
nation is frequently unwilling or unable to enforce public laws for fear of
loss of that corporate economic activity.11  Yet there is some question as to
whether the home nation has jurisdiction to enforce human rights or other
public law violations by its multinationals operating overseas.12  With
downsizing due to market pressure and/or post-merger labour shedding,
dislocation costs exist, even where they do not appear on the corporate
balance sheet.  They are increasingly borne by those disadvantaged by
corporate restructuring, not by those who have been the beneficiaries of the
wealth generated.
Women disproportionately bear the economic burden of both private law
externalities and public law shifts away from national standards. Many
women are less mobile because they are single parents and have caregiving
obligations.  Relocation costs rarely account for the social costs of changing
schools, communities, friends, social supports, and the impact on children
that women are left to cope with.13  Where women are in a two-wage family,
the partner frequently earns more, based on longstanding inequitable pay
practices, thus making women workers less able to relocate in order to find
comparable employment.  Immigrant women and women of colour dispro-
portionately occupy the most economically disadvantaged positions in terms
of employment conditions.14  This unequal status permeates across nations
and their corporations with diverse capital structures. Externalities have a
serious long-term affect on all workers, but in particular, there are harms to
women that are not accounted for in the costing of corporate decisions.
The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change 465
VOLUME 1  •  ISSUE 2  •  2002
Women continue to be the primary caregivers of our children and our rapidly
aging population.  As a result, women are less likely to have disposable cash
because of disruptions to employment, which then carry an income penalty
and employment choices, which are made to accommodate their caregiving
responsibilities.  Women are also justifiably risk averse because as mothers
and daughters they bear the brunt of economic support of their families.15
Opportunity costs and risk assessment are undertaken differently.
None of these costs and considerations are included in the calculus
employed by contractarians.  Optimal corporate governance is measured by
generation of surplus value, measured by externalizing all these costs.
The indicia of effective governance then becomes short-term return to share-
holders in the form of dividends or share price as the signal of market
confidence in the governance of the corporation.  The debate regarding
optimal governance becomes more immediate with the move to global
capital markets.  Corporate governance is only one aspect of the larger frame-
work of macroeconomic policies, competition, trade and tax policy, global
capital, products and labour markets, and domestic cultural norms and
ethics.  Enhanced access to capital globally is dependent on the ability to
offer corporate governance systems that are clearly articulated and adhered
to within regulatory and legal frameworks that support contractual and
ownership rights.16  Thus, with the emergence of global capital markets, the
governance debate continues to situate itself as a purely property based
regime, with private property viewed as a key means by which resources are
used efficiently in our society.  Discussion focuses on the need to protect
those property rights under vastly differing legal and political regimes, cor-
relating effective governance with shareholder protection, investor confidence,
and developed external capital markets.17  Thus, there is emphasis on regula-
tory protection that safeguards equity and debt capital.
In this respect, the system is not a “free market” system, but rather, highly
regulated to protect property as the underpinning of market activity, such as
contract enforcement, debt collection regimes, and protection for equity
investors from managerial self-dealing transactions.  These considerations
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are key to global capital markets and key to the ability of domestic corpo-
rations to participate competitively.  However, they are not the only con-
siderations.  The issues of gender discrimination and harms caused by
corporate transactions are not part of the governance debate, other than as an
assessment of liability risk from human rights violations or tort claims.  Given
the recognized public and private law aspects of capital markets and corpo-
rate governance, the question is why public policy intervenes to protect prop-
erty rights, but is not equally interventionist in setting standards of corporate
conduct that make decision makers accountable for equality, employment
standards, job security, human rights harms, unnecessary torts, and environ-
mental protection.  In this respect, feminist corporate law scholarship has an
important contribution to make in developing insights about governance in
global markets.
B.  The Need for a Specific Feminist Voice in the Corporate Governance
B.  Discourse
Communitarianism and socio-economics, both alternative approaches to
corporate law, have generally suggested that corporations, in generating
wealth, should ensure that decision makers are accountable to communities
in which the corporation operates, although these two approaches are grounded
in different economic analyses of corporate law.18  Shareholder wealth maxi-
mization as an objective is tempered by corporate citizenship and for some
scholars, enhanced labour participation in corporate governance to promote
socially positive corporate behaviour.19  While the socio-economic and
communitarian models are more likely to take account of women as workers
at risk, this needs to be made more explicit.
1.  Women as Workers
The needs of working women and men closely converge, especially at the
lower end of the economic scale.  However, women continue to face addi-
tional serious barriers at work including: wage and benefit inequality, lack
of access to jobs, sexual and racial harassment, and pressure to sacrifice their
caregiving responsibilities in order to advance in the corporation.  Access to
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pension plans depends on women’s participation in the workforce in sectors
that provide pension plans, and thus women are doubly disadvantaged by
lack of pension income and by tax policies that subsidize such plans.20  While
unionization has frequently worked to reduce these disparities, the majority
of working women in Canada and the United States are not unionized.  More-
over, in numerous transition and developed economies, unions (if they are
permitted) continue to be male-dominated and are not yet advocates on
behalf of women’s workplace and domestic equality.  In some cases, unions
have long recognized the link between workplace oppression and other forms
of oppression against women, which is why in Canada, large segments of the
labour movement have aggressively supported issues such as freedom of
choice, universally accessible childcare, and employment and pay equity.21
However, these are far from universal norms.
2.  Women as Investors
Moreover, even within the operating shareholder wealth maximization
paradigm, while there has been growth in the activities of women as equity
investors, notions of shareholder wealth maximization recognize and accord
decision making power to particular classes of shareholders, and thus have a
disproportionate effect on women as small investors.  While contractarian
theory recognizes the inability of small investors to bargain complete
contracts, it fails to articulate who small investors are and where they are
situated within the corporate hierarchy.  Women earn less than similarly
situated men and thus have far less disposable cash to undertake equity
investment.  This wage disparity also impacts their ability to purchase the
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP) that have become so prevalent in
the United States, or their ability to have secure pension investments.22  As
less senior employees in many fields, they are vulnerable to “last hired,
first laid-off” policies and thus are less likely to have capital available to
make equity investments and diversify their risks.  Moreover, there is a
legitimate question as to whether the solution of the shareholder model is to
encourage women to invest more of their scarce resources as equity
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investors, particularly when these investors appear to be increasingly disen-
franchised in the governance debate and more at risk from corporate
misconduct than ever before.23
Shareholder wealth maximization as the exclusive goal of corporate
governance is inadequate in its analysis of corporate activity.  While share-
holders supply equity capital, there are other important investor groups, those
who contribute debt capital and workers who contribute human capital.  These
investors are also frequently residual claimants, particularly at the point that
a firm experiences financial distress and there is little or no equity remaining
in the corporation.  At this point, workers and creditors are the only residual
claimants to the value of the firm’s assets, yet the nature of this investment is
inadequately accounted for in corporate decision making, even though it is
frequently decisions made long before the financial distress that have preju-
diced these interests. Whereas senior creditors can bargain more complete
contracts to factor in the risk of firm failure or managerial misconduct, this is
not the case with unsecured creditors and workers.24  Thus many of the same
reasons driving shareholder primacy, such as incomplete contracts and
residual claims, should also drive recognition of these investors’ interests in
corporate governance.
Yet the goal of shareholder wealth maximization continues to permeate
the collective consciousness of scholars and corporate decision makers.
Obligations under corporate law statutes for directors and officers to act in
the “best interests of the corporation,” continue to be defined as best inter-
ests of shareholders, even though that is not the language of the statute.  In
the wake of corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, the focus of
securities regulators and legislators is on the failure in accountability to
equity investors and debates about whether these are regulatory failures or
merely a need to engage in more regulatory gatekeeping within the existing
paradigm.25  These are aimed at the narrow question of shareholder protec-
tion, which, while extremely important in a market-based economy, is
certainly not the only harm identified with these failures.
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C.  Feminist Corporate Law Scholarship—Making Gender Visible
Recently, feminist corporate law scholars have drawn attention to the
dominant theoretical approaches on the basis that they reflect a very male-
centered view of corporate law.26  These scholars are contributing feminist
values to their analysis of corporate governance, resulting in a more textured
and comprehensive approach to governance reform.  Scholars such as Lynne
Dallas, Marleen O’Connor, Kellye Testy, and Cheryl Wade are at the fore-
front of socio-economic and similar approaches to corporate law, providing
a systematic and thoughtful analysis of governance failures, corporate board
strategies, worker empowerment in corporate decision making, and elimina-
tion of racial discrimination through corporate social responsibility.27  Theresa
Gabaldon observes that while there are diverse definitions and theoretical
approaches within feminism, feminist insights frequently converge in their
objective of seeking to expose and eliminate women’s inequality.28  Feminist
legal theory is a complex legal scholarship, grounded not only in race and
class differences, but also in different norms regarding economic systems.
This becomes particularly evident in corporate law, where scholarship ranges
from working within the existing paradigm to much more fundamental
reconceptualization of the corporation as the principle mechanism to gen-
erate wealth.  While these are legitimate debates, their resolution is a far
more ambitious project beyond the scope of this article.  Yet, feminist legal
scholarship shares, in Ronnie Cohen’s words, a common understanding
that law as oppression is insidious, because once a particular view of social
ordering is incorporated into law, it is perceived as neutral, when in reality it
represents normative choices regarding women’s social and economic
status.29  Ramona Paetzold notes that feminist theory is aimed at exposing
the language of business law that appears objective but which embodies and
makes invisible the oppression of women.30  The gender impact of current
market-based theory is what needs to be made visible and remedied, and
this project can benefit from feminist insights across a range of class, race,
political and theoretical perspectives.
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Kellye Testy has analysed the various approaches to greater social
accountability of corporations.  Using, as a starting point, Audre Lorde’s
concern that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,”
she observes that the progressive law movement risks being domesticated
and thus may fail to mount a significant challenge to the status quo of cor-
porate activity.31  Moreover, there is a risk of commodification of corporate
social responsibility in pursuit of shareholder wealth, with these commodity
preferences easily retracted if consumer preferences change.32  Testy sug-
gests that corporate power is neither inherently oppressive or one-sided, and
that one should be willing to both work with the “master’s tools” and to
design new ones.  Her conception of corporate law includes an objective of
wealth dispersion, a reduction in subordination and discrimination based on
gender, race and ability, environmental justice, and enhanced social democ-
racy.  Cheryl Wade’s scholarship promotes a socially responsible corporate
governance model through the combined efforts of shareholders, consumers,
and community in holding directors and officers accountable for socially
irresponsible decision making.33  The persistence of racial workplace dis-
crimination is the result of boards’ unwillingness to acknowledge the
existence of racism and shareholders’ over-reliance on corporate boards to
monitor managerial conduct in this respect.34  She calls for social wealth
maximization as an objective shareholder and consumer pressure to ensure
public laws, such as labour standards, human rights, and consumer protec-
tion are complied with and judicial reconceptualization of the business
judgment rule where the underlying policy reasons for particular corporate
actions include systemic racism.
Ronnie Cohen has also suggested that corporate law would benefit from
inclusion of feminist values in the area of corporate social responsibility,
labour relations, and consumer, occupational, and environmental safety.  In
this, collective behaviour would replace investor passivity, and corporations
could be structured to permit or mandate evaluation by investors based on
responsibility in addition to profitability.35  Cohen’s approach would convert
the corporate environment from one that is adversarial, self-interested, and
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hierarchical into one that is co-operative and relationship building.36  Cohen
observes that while corporate law provides a check on corporate behaviour,
its failure to recognize the social component of the corporation’s role in
society can be remedied by requiring those responsible for corporate mis-
conduct to be personally involved in redressing the consequences of that
conduct.37  Others have suggested that corporate officers and perhaps even
shareholders that engage in the risk/benefit assessments of corporate deci-
sions should be held accountable for those decisions.38  Thus, they should be
required to be personally involved in remedying the harms caused by their
tortious and other decisions, on the basis that monetary damages alone may
not make corporate decision makers responsible for the full impact of the
harm.39  This scholarship is helpful in opening up a conception of the
corporation and its governance mechanisms that more fully reflects complex
corporate realities.
Feminist corporate law scholarship seeks to eliminate gender and racially-
based discrimination and to make visible the interests and contributions in
the firm that have not been previously recognized, including values of
collaboration and care giving.  It seeks to make these interests, costs, and
power relations visible in order to both recognize and redress the disad-
vantage engendered by failure to value them.  Feminist critiques face the
same resistance that communitarian or corporate responsibility scholarship
has faced, that claims for a revised conception of the corporation ignore
“efficiency” requirements, and that employment equality and similar issues
are a matter of public, as opposed to private law.  Underlying the shareholder
wealth maximization norm is an articulated definition of “efficiency” that
continues to justify corporate decisions that advance the interests of equity
capital owners to the exclusion of other investors in the firm.
III. CORPORATIONS AND GENDERED NOTIONS OF EFFICIENCY
“Efficiency” has become a principal objective of corporate activity and
has been defined as raising capital in the least cost manner and deploying
that capital to generate surplus value to the corporation, with a view to
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maximizing shareholder wealth.  “Efficiency” is cast as a neutral objective,
a cost-benefit analysis that creates profits that eventually accrue to share-
holders in the form of increased share price or shareholder dividends after all
the costs of credit, labour and other production inputs, research, and expan-
sion are accounted for.  “Efficiency” is thus measured by return on equity
investment, frequently, a short-term return on investment.
A.  Efficiency is Normatively Defined
It is rarely acknowledged that currently “efficiency” is very normatively
defined.  As noted above, many costs are externalized and thus are not
measured in the calculation of surplus value.  As shareholder wealth
maximization is the primary goal, efficiency is then measured against this
benchmark.  The failure to cost externalities creates a windfall gain for
equity investors who become the beneficiaries of breaches of implicit
deferred compensation contracts.  This “efficiency,” normatively defined,
continues to shift wealth to those already propertied and supports the share-
holder wealth maximization paradigm.
Efficiency is thus not a neutral term; the values underpinning it are
chosen and can thus be differently selected.  I have suggested that the nor-
mative definition of efficiency needs to be recast away from the notion of
shareholder wealth maximization to one of maximizing return to all those
with investments at risk in the corporation.40  This recasting requires account-
ing for all costs of corporate activity, including recognizing the full nature of
workers’ investments, beyond the wage-labour bargain, by recognizing
contributions to production synergies, customer and client loyalty, deferred
compensation, and forgone decisions regarding family.  This approach
further recognizes costs that are currently externalized such as labour adjust-
ment and the social costs of labour shedding.  I have proposed principles for
a formula for valuing such inputs that would give rise to claims on the
corporation’s assets.41  In respect of workers, this formula would cost
variables such as deferred wages, years of service, expected working life,
expected future increase in wages and benefits, gross earnings that would
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accrue to the corporation if it meets a promise of expected employment and
earnings, discounted by factors such as probability of obtaining comparable
employment elsewhere, immediate value of claims now and not deferred to
a future date and other similar factors.42
When these costs and claims on the value of the corporation’s assets are
accounted for, efficiency is necessarily recast in the way in which it is mea-
sured because surplus value or profits are measured more accurately and take
account of costs currently externalized.  Labour shedding would now be based
on decisions that have an internalized economic cost attached, instead of such
costs being externalized and thus counted as a benefit accruing to equity
investors.  In turn, this would create ex ante incentives to reduce these costs
by considering whether there are more effective ways of using human capital
contributions in corporate activity than labour shedding.
Similarly, one could create a value that recognizes gender within corpo-
rate economic activity.  One can measure non-discriminatory employment
practices not only in the savings from civil law suits in the United States or
damage awards from government prosecution of human rights violations in
Canada, but also in the quantifying of the value to human dignity for women
workers and workers of colour.  This approach can measure the costs of harm
from discrimination, equitable pay practices, the social costs to children when
women suffer the social and economic effects of discrimination, and the costs
of child and elder care so that women can contribute their labour.   As with
human capital contributions generally, these costs can be measured and
utilized in a new normative definition and calculation of efficiency.  Until
they are measured and valued, the efficiency debate will always result in
maximizing equity capital to the exclusion of other costs and considerations.
The link between capital markets and corporate governance, while impor-
tant, does not reflect interests that are not defined as traditional property rights.
One can also measure efficiency and surplus value as including the
generation of long-term value in environmentally sound corporate activity.
This inclusion is an issue for feminists, not only as citizens and participants
in economic activity, but as caregivers, because women will ultimately
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bear the economic and social brunt of long-term health effects from environ-
mental harms.  This burden  is evident not only from the massive tort claims
of the past decade, such as the Dalkon Shield and the breast implant class
actions, which overwhelmingly have involved harms to women, but other
serious environmental harms as well such as asbestos poisoning, which has
increased women’s responsibilities in caring for terminally ill asbestosis
victims.43  Calculation of surplus value that more appropriately attributes the
costs of environmental harm or prevention would require costing a number
of factors including: the cost of compliance with environmental protection
laws; the costs in taxes for strong enforcement mechanisms; the liability risk
from direct environmental harms and a calculation of proportional respon-
sibility of the corporation for harm from the long-term depletion of the
environment; the costs and benefits of maintaining safe workplaces; the
benefits that may accrue to the quality of air, land, or water in the commu-
nities that surround a corporation’s production facility if the corporation
engages in sound environmental management practices; and the benefits that
may accrue to the community in terms of enhanced health outcomes result-
ing from a shift away from environmentally harmful corporate activities.
While many of these costs are part of the public law calculus, they are
frequently not part of the corporation’s costing in terms of efficiency.
B.  Reconstructing Costs, Benefits, and Investments in the Corporation
The language of “free market” is accompanied by calls for state regula-
tory control to protect private property and control transaction costs in
corporate activity across national borders.44  The same rationale is not,
however, applied to regulation of corporate activity to take account of the
contributions of women, workers, and communities to the economic life of
the corporation.  Investments in the firm beyond equity and debt capital are
not considered property or valued as non-property inputs, notwithstanding
the fact that these investments enhance firm value through innovation,
loyalty, organizational skills, and the synergistic value generated when workers
work collaboratively.  Feminist legal scholars have challenged this omission.45
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Barbara Ann White has suggested that feminist legal analysis can assist
with the cost/benefit analysis used by law and economics scholars by defin-
ing social justice within the context of economic efficiency and by examin-
ing distributions of economic rights.46  White suggests that the evaluation of
societal economic well-being should include the distribution of income, where
the number of individuals who earn a decent living is maximized.47  A key
flaw in market theory reasoning is that initial distributions of property and
political rights determines the scope of possible economic and political
outcomes when one is looking at market allocations of resources, goods, and
services.48  Cost/benefit analysis is then measured from this starting point.
This critique does not require a complete rejection of the insights that are
generated by market theory in trying to determine which corporate gover-
nance principles are optimal, rather it builds on these insights.  The various
theoretical approaches collectively offer a wealth of analytical tools in con-
sidering optimal governance principles.  Elements of each can be utilized to
enhance our notions of effective corporate governance.  The nexus of the
contractual relationship approach highlights agency costs and ex ante
bargaining problems for negotiating complete contracts.  However, its con-
clusion that shareholders are the only residual claimants needs revisiting,
given that workers also have residual claims based on their human capital
investments such as deferred compensation systems and inability to nego-
tiate complete contracts.  Equity investment, giving rise to the shareholder
primacy norm, needs to be counterbalanced by recognition of debt capital,
human capital investments, and local community investments in the infra-
structure that supports the corporation’s economic activities.  For example,
local trade suppliers frequently have investments in the firm beyond their
fixed capital claims, particularly in smaller communities.  The communities
themselves may have made investments such as forgone municipal taxes,
zoning by-law changes, or waivers of environmental remediation orders.
These investments are of a longer term and residual nature.  In addition, these
investors, unlike senior secured creditors, can rarely bargain full contracts.
Their claims to an interest in the corporation’s decision making would give
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rise to a notion of enterprise wealth maximization, as opposed to shareholder
wealth maximization, as the more appropriate benchmark for corporate
decision making.  It should also give rise to more equitable distribution of
corporate rents, as these interests would be entitled to a return on their input
into corporate activities.
Communitarian and socio-economic scholarship adds the notion of social
responsibility or corporate citizenship and makes the integral link between
the public policy and private law aspects of corporate governance.  However,
public policy and private law frequently fail to explain why private corporate
actors are better situated to make decisions that affect the interests of both
the public and those with a direct interest in the corporation’s activities.  Some
distinction is required to discern how private law mechanisms can be devel-
oped to more fully cost inputs and liability for corporate activity, and public
law must be enhanced to better protect economically and socially disad-
vantaged groups and remedy ongoing inequitable distributions of property.
Corporate social responsibility should not displace the role of public law in
setting and enforcing equitable standards in employment, human rights, health
and safety, tax, consumer protection and other laws designed to set mini-
mum standards of protection and create a measure of corporate liability to
ensure these standards are met.  While the corporation is integrally linked to
the social and economic life of the communities in which it operates, it should
not, under the guise of corporate social responsibility, unilaterally set the
normative standards of that responsibility.  To solely entrust corporations
with such responsibility creates the risk, as Testy has suggested, of failing to
mount a significant challenge to the current corporate law paradigm.49
The design of a feminist law and economics approach to corporate law
and efficiency is intuitively appealing.  It takes the best of all these ideas and
conceptualizes a firm with gender and racial equality based on a costing that
reflects value that does accrue to corporations.  Such a model is unlikely to
be implemented in my lifetime, if ever.  As noted earlier, the current share-
holder wealth maximization paradigm is a function of longstanding property
relations.  Those who are propertied, overwhelmingly men, are not going to
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divest their holdings in support of a reconceptualization of the corporation.
Power and property are never forfeited willingly, and feminist conceptions
of the corporation challenge precisely those underpinnings.  The “revolu-
tion” or “evolution” in corporate law is not around the corner, the block, or
even the next country.  If anything, as capital moves outward, global con-
vergence pressure has meant that the most gendered effects of the current
Anglo-American regime are being adopted in other countries.  So why
consider this topic at all?  Feminism frequently includes optimism, often
pragmatism, and definitely an inherent ability to adjust to social reality.  Thus,
while the picture may be noir, there is a normative conception of the corpo-
ration that is attainable in the interim which could ameliorate some of the
inequities discussed above, if costs are fully accounted for, and if power in
corporate decision making shifts to multiple parties implicated in the firm.
IV. SHIFTING THE PARADIGM TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF GENDER IN THE
BOARDROOM, THE WORKPLACE, AND OUR COLLECTIVE
CONSCIOUSNESS
One can begin to develop a notion of corporate governance that takes
account of the continuum of interests implicated in the firm.  These invest-
ments can be costed in such a way that firms would undertake decision
making that maximizes firm wealth, if costs were fully accounted for as
suggested above.  Corporate decision making should value the interests of a
broad number of individuals making investments in the firm, not merely those
of equity capital investors.  “Investors” or “stakeholders” can be broadly
defined as those with an interest in the corporation, including creditors,
employees, suppliers, consumers, and local communities.  There continues
to be inadequate analysis of governance structures that would best enhance
these firm specific investments.50  The Anglo-American paradigm has been
that employees do not have investments in the corporation greater than the
wage/effort bargain, and thus corporate decision makers should not be
accountable to them.  Performance incentives for employees are applauded
with no concomitant rights attaching to their human capital investments.
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While participatory mechanisms such as worker councils, ESOPs, and other
equity investment initiatives are gaining recognition, these programs present
some risk of further expropriation of workers’ investments, unless a gover-
nance role accompanies these changes.  Only more recently has there been a
suggestion that the nature of human capital investment may be specialized,
beyond fixed capital claims, such that their interests need to be accounted for
in governance of the corporation.51
A.  Law, Economics, and Feminism in the Boardroom
Absent clear duties imposed on corporate officers and effective enforce-
able remedies for those who have investments in the firm, an enterprise wealth
maximization model will not shift the paradigm.  Canada does not have any
stakeholder statutes similar to those enacted in more than 25 U.S. states.
However, the U.S. experience indicates that these statutes were a response to
the active takeover market of the 1980s, not a recognition of diverse invest-
ments.  Under all these statutes except one, the consideration by corporate
officers of stakeholder interest is discretionary and there are no enforceable
remedies under any of the statutes.52  The enterprise wealth maximization
model suggested here would create enforceable remedies for investors, broadly
defined.  This model would include enforcement of duties to comply with
public laws, undertaking a full accounting of costs and benefits of particular
corporate actions, and broader representation of investor interest at multiple
levels of the corporate decision making structure.  Corporate officers should
have a fiduciary obligation to undertake decision making in the best interests
of the corporation, mainly those with interests and investments in the cor-
poration.53  The statutory framework for “best interests of the corporation”
already exists; however, it needs to be normatively redefined to enterprise
wealth maximization as opposed to shareholder wealth maximization.  This
model must include women in their multiple lives as workers, mothers,
equity investors, and community members.
Interestingly, the norms debate, which has occupied the recent attention
of law and economics scholars, seeks to explain particular corporate conduct
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that does not easily fit into the pure market-driven conception of the corpo-
ration.  It suggests that corporate officers engage in stewardship of the
corporation influenced by norms that bridge the gap between corporate law,
efficiency enhancing activity, and duties of care and loyalty.54  Norms have
been variously described as rules emanating from social forces, non-legally
enforceable standards, and behavioural patterns or systems of co-operation
driven by a common understanding rather than externally imposed laws.55
Norms can be independent of or reinforce laws, they can be internally or
externally enforced through market or other economic, reputational, or
social sanctioning.  And, depending on one’s perspective, they enhance or
detract from efficiency.56  The debate takes the form of whether or not norms
enhance corporate governance, such that the public regulatory framework
need not intervene in creating standards of corporate conduct.57  The norms
debate also unpacks what activities or decisions are attributable to influences
within the firm, as opposed to those largely attributable to market pressure,
in discerning the most efficient combination of corporate decision making.
However, even with the explosion of literature on the influence of norms,
the treatment of gender within the governance structure is negligible.  In
part, this is likely the result of the majority of corporate directors and corpo-
rate law scholars being male, and thus the gender implications are frequently
not on their radar screens.  It is also a result of the invisibility of women’s
contributions to the development of norms in the corporation’s activities.
These attitudes are learned behaviour in the home, school, and workplace.
For example, today’s corporate officers, business lawyers, and legal scholars
are a product of a legal education system that emphasized competition, not
collaboration;58 emphasized maximizing shareholder wealth, not the recog-
nition of diverse interests in the firm; and emphasized doctrinal learning, not
expansion of existing approaches to corporate law.
What is required is a reconceptualization of the corporation, textured by
feminism and law and economics. This is not a complete contradiction in
terms.  Law and economics offers a theorized account of how and why
corporate decision makers act in addition to the economic incentives that
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influence those actions.  Further, it offers insights into where regulatory
control must be added in order to create the appropriate incentives.  For
example, current regulation is aimed at enhancing transparency and reduc-
ing self-dealing transactions, although as noted above, there are some recent
spectacular failures in this respect.  Regulation should also create greater
incentives to ensure that corporate decision making reduces and eventually
eliminates gender and racial discrimination.  That can only be accomplished
by assigning some personal responsibility to the corporate decision makers
for acts that are harmful and/or discriminatory.  It requires codification of
obligations in respect of how costs are to be accounted for in corporate
economic activity.  It could also be accomplished by placing limits on the
amount of political influence corporations should have in policy making, or
alternatively, requiring corporations to fund public and community based
lobbying efforts consistent with their own lobbying efforts.59
It should be kept in mind that factors such as the legal and regulatory
regime, and its enforcement, also influence the ability of capital markets to
act as an effective tool for channelling investments efficiently.  There is
counter-pressure to global convergence of norms because of the strong his-
torical framework that operates to determine corporate governance practice.60
The exhaustive literature on path dependency and market convergence has
been helpful in understanding pressures against convergence by suggesting
that governance models reflect the historical, legal, and political frameworks
in which they operate.61  The same observation can be made about gendered
views of the corporation and barriers to fundamental change.  There may be
a good business case to be made for long-term enterprise wealth maximiza-
tion by according some governance role to employees and other residual
claimants and to restructuring decision making to reflect feminist values and
approaches, but it is unlikely to occur without intervention in the market.
This market intervention is necessary because the transaction costs of
accomplishing this restructuring may be viewed as too high, and the benefits
of a redistributive nature (towards women, other workers, communities) too
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great a challenge to existing property norms to be acceptable to major equity
capital investors and their agents.
However, path dependence scholarship has for the most part failed to
explore how the normative and regulatory frameworks in which corporate
governance practice is determined have an inequitable impact on men and
women.  Social, political, and cultural attitudes towards women inform views
regarding wage inequality, unequal access to jobs, training, and decision
making roles within the corporate hierarchy.  In Anglo-American systems,
these tensions are measured against a benchmark of efficiency in maximiz-
ing shareholder value, and are therefore aimed at maintaining inequity.  Strong
historical conceptions of women operate to situate them at the low end of
corporate hierarchies and to undervalue and make invisible their contribu-
tions.  Women’s work, including office work, cleaning, caregiving, nurturing,
and service work is systematically undervalued or discounted.  Moreover,
much of the value generated for corporations from goodwill, administrative
efficiencies, and effective time management skills are attributed to the
managers for whom women are frequently the support workers.  The first
litigation in Canada under pay equity legislation made clear that the
Anglo-American system of compensation generally attributes such work
efficiencies to the supervisor, rather than the support staff member who
organises that manager’s time and activities.62
B.  Women’s Contribution to Economic and Social Wealth
Women generally contribute to collaboration and productive workplace
relationships, bring dispute resolution skills, and the ability to build firm
loyalty.  These skills, acquired in the home and community, are frequently
applied in the workplace, creating value for the corporation.  Women also
have organizational and multi-tasking skills that are a function of the role
they play in families.  The image of women up early, laundry done, bills
paid, lunches being made, breakfast prepared, organizing the family for school,
work, sports and childcare, dealing with the school bus, permission slips,
lost homework or lost socks, getting herself to work by 8 or 9 a.m., working
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a full shift and continuing with a second family shift after paid work, con-
tinues to be a familiar image to most women today.  These same skills are
utilized but not necessarily recognized in the corporation.  They are rarely
explicitly accounted for in valuing women’s labour, as is evident in the hard
fight for pay equity, comparable worth, and employment equity struggles of
the past two decades.
Moreover, there is an intricate link between public regulation and where
women are situated in the corporation.  While access to education has sub-
stantially improved in North America, young women continue to be streamed
into particular fields of work in support, service, and caregiving.  There
continues to be resistance to the presence of women in decision making roles.
This channelling supports corporate activities because women provide the
underlying support structure, both in the workplace and the home, in terms
of child and elderly care, office support services, health care, and teaching,
thus allowing their male co-workers or domestic partners to fully participate
in the governance of the corporation.  These are costs that are rarely accounted
for in the firm.  Even public programs perpetuate gender bias.  For example,
social assistance agencies continue to stream women on welfare into service
and “hairdressing” jobs and training, while men are streamed into skilled
trades and technology based training as a condition of continued receipt of
welfare payments.63  Thus, there is a dual stream of value not accounted for,
the costs borne by women in community and family, and the benefits
accruing directly to the corporation through women’s work.
The failure of public policy to require more systemic change means that
public law reinforces current inequities and, in turn, is complicit in corporate
law’s failure to examine more comprehensive corporate decision making
models.  Unemployment insurance and other social safety net cutbacks,
combined with inadequate childcare services, simultaneously prevent women
from seeking employment and from fulfilling nurturing roles.  Lack of
unionization in sectors dominated by women exacerbates their economic
vulnerability.  Moreover, the pervasive nature of sexual harassment informs
women’s choices about work.  Women assess opportunity costs in different
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ways with family and social responsibilities trumping many considerations
of promotion or advancement.  The fact that firm and family loyalty are largely
viewed as mutually exclusive, as opposed to complementary, creates a
gendered view of opportunity costs.  Corporate models that reward those
who work long hours and socialize after regular working hours can be a
direct sanction on workers with families, particularly women who are pri-
mary caregivers.  Women tend to work highly efficiently and in a timely
manner in order to leave work to meet their family obligations such as
childcare closing hours and dual priorities and objectives.  Women’s family
obligations continue to be viewed as failure to be committed to the produc-
tive life of the corporation.  For young women who do not yet have families
or have chosen not to, there is normative pressure to engage in the male model
of competition, including working excessive hours, tolerating discrimination,
and discounting feminist values.
One can anticipate the hue and cry from adoption of a model that
recognizes these skills and contributions.  As discussed in Parts II and III,
contractarian theory suggests that any harmful effects of corporate decisions
should be left to public law or private bargaining.  It suggests that the current
dismantling of social safety nets are not a matter for corporate law, and that
shareholders are the sole residual claimants to the corporate assets and thus
governance should be aimed exclusively in their interests.  Yet, as discussed
above, private bargaining continues to distort distribution of property and
public law reform which, in itself, is inadequate to address the complexities
of economic activity in a global economy.  Claims that accounting for all
costs would leave corporate managers unaccountable fail to acknowledge
that investors generally, including smaller shareholders, currently face this
problem.  In general, the system needs to be more responsive  to those with
investments (broadly defined) in the corporation.
C.  Our Collective Consciousness
Our normative and gendered conception of the corporation hinders our
collective and individual ability to recognize the signs of ineffective gover-
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nance.  While recent scandals have illustrated the potential for harms to
investors and creditors, it has not resulted in more fundamental rethinking
about corporate activity as a potential site for the elimination of discrimina-
tion or distribution of wealth on a more equitable basis.
Corporations are not bearing all costs of society, nor would they under a
wealth enterprise maximization model.  What is suggested here is attributing
costs that are a direct benefit to the firm or have a “nexus with the economic
activity” of the corporation.64  A comparable example is environmental law,
where corporations can be found proportionately liable under Canadian law
for environmental remediation based on a prior contribution to harm from
particular use of land for its economic activities.65  While all environmental
costs are not internalized in the firm, particularly the costs to long-term
sustainability, the current regime does take greater account of environmental
costs within the firm than the costs of gender and race harms and the benefits
of women’s contribution to generation of surplus value.  If the costs of
human rights compliance, labour shedding, and employment standards were
internalized within the firm where there is a nexus with the economic
activity of the firm, there would be different ex ante incentives created in
corporate treatment of gender and race issues.  If these changes were accom-
panied by reduced information asymmetries, enforceable remedies, an
enhanced governance role for multiple types of investors, and a recasting of
corporate objectives to enterprise wealth maximization, one would begin to
see a slight shift in the corporate law paradigm.
D.  Women’s Participation in Corporate Governance
Women should participate as decision makers at all levels of the corpo-
rate structure, in order to bring greater depth to corporate decision making in
its analysis of the costs and benefits (social and economic) of corporate
decisions.  However, mere rights to participate are inadequate on their own.
Several elements would have to be present in order for women’s participa-
tion in decision making to provide an opportunity for meaningful change.  It
requires collaborative efforts on the shop or service floor as well as in the
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boardroom, and the ability to enforce public policy standards and fiduciary
obligations to act in the best interests of the corporation, taking into account
all those with investments in the firm.66  It will be necessary to reconceptualize
the underlying norms in corporate governance decisions in order to legiti-
mize the taking into account and valuing of these other interests, including
women’s interests.
Clearly all women do not share the same values and goals, and their
interests are separated by class and race.  However, the almost complete
absence of women’s participation at senior levels of corporate decision
making means an important set of governance perspectives is lost.  Feminist
values can enhance corporate governance.  Women tend not to compart-
mentalize their lives, but rather bring innovation, collaboration and relation-
ship building, all of which are valuable contributions to the enterprise.  There
is some discordance with the existing law and economics norms literature,
which discusses the value generated through collaboration and corporate
norms, in that it is generally silent on how women make these contributions.
Change in many cases may require legislative amendment for which there
may not be political or social will, given strong historical reasons for the
current governance model.
Change of fiduciary obligations for corporate directors and officers should
be accompanied by fundamental structural change in the workplace.  This
would include reduction of information asymmetries for workers; enshrin-
ing a culture of equity and diversity; according workers meaningful par-
ticipation in the way that work processes are designed and delivered; and
collective decision making power regarding restructuring that ensures where
possible protection of job security, retraining and placement in new cor-
porate activities.  Such participatory work programs that simultaneously
accord value and protection to workers’ inputs will enhance the position of
women, in particular, the working lives of women situated at the lower end
of the economic scale.  It will also contribute to the generation of wealth.
However, workplace models that extract greater value from workers create a
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risk of expropriation of this value, absent clear normative choices ensuring
that value accrues to all those investing in the corporation’s activities.
Even within a collaborative framework of internalized costs and shift of
fiduciary obligation, power inequities will continue to inform corporate
decision making.  While the model would likely temper power imbalances, it
is highly unlikely that it would eliminate them, given all of the external
actors that influence governance norms, such as banks and other secured
lenders, institutional investors, regulators, international trade organizations,
and new forms of derivative securities that have insisted on a governance
role as part of their investment.  Thus, for women and other workers, unions
and other labour and equality advocacy groups would continue to have an
essential role in terms of advocacy and bargaining to redress imbalances
in power.
Interest-based bargaining models also take shareholder primacy as a
normative starting point, and these must therefore be recast as bargaining
towards a more equitable distribution of wealth and decision making power.
At Algoma Steel corporation, for example, while there are union appointed
directors on the corporate board, the union continues to view its own role as
essentially one of advocacy and representation, while the union nominated
directors act in the “best interests of the corporation.”  Elsewhere I have
discussed this corporate model.67  Moreover, these private law shifts cannot
be accomplished in isolation from public law shifts.  Absent protections
under law against human rights discrimination, improved labour standards,
consumer protection, worker and environmental safety, much of the energy
of participants would be directed towards normative struggles as to the
content of socially responsible behaviour.  These laws must be considered a
minimum threshold of redressing the worst inequities, not the ultimate goal.
However, the threshold itself needs to be redefined to eliminate some of the
most devastating social and economic consequences of gender and racial
inequality.  Thus an integrated approach is necessary, albeit definitely a
daunting agenda.  Absent an understanding of how these issues are integrally
linked, there will not be a recasting of the corporate law paradigm.
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V. ACCOUNTABILITY BY CORPORATE DECISION MAKERS
A.  Boardroom Demographics
In Canada, a survey found in 2001 that only 9.8% of corporate board
seats are held by women.68  The United States fares only marginally better,
with 12.4% of board seats of Fortune 500 companies held by women.69
The rationale used to exclude women from board seats is that directors
require CEO experience.  Yet the cyclical effect of this rationale is immedi-
ately apparent.  Without a diversity of views in the corporate boardroom, it is
unlikely that women senior officers will be appointed, as there are strong
cultural norms of hiring someone that resembles the person doing the hiring.
Without this job experience, there will not be access to the boardroom.  The
Canadian survey also found that corporations may look increasingly at women
for board seats post-Enron because of a new awareness of the need for finan-
cial literacy skills on boards, an area in which women are occupationally
represented.  The need for financially literate board members may encour-
age boards to look for women directors because they are generally more
financially literate, occupying accounting and auditing fields, and because
they tend to pay more careful attention to financial details.  These skills and
abilities will enhance corporate governance.
It is important to note that women drawn from the ranks of the auditing
and accounting profession are likely to be representative of the same
privileged class as current directors.  Thus drawing women from auditing
and accounting professions will not necessarily create the wider diversity of
views in corporate decision making that will enhance governance, as norma-
tively defined above.  Marleen O’Connor has written thoughtfully on the
perils of “group-think,” where homogeneity creates an inability to critically
assess the activities of corporate officers.70  Inadequate definitions of “inde-
pendent” directors, group loyalty, and a lack of diversity on corporate boards
all contribute to poor quality decision making.  O’Connor suggests that even
where boards appoint a couple of women, they tend to appoint women who
share the same class and views as themselves, failing to create the heter-
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ogeneity that would enhance board oversight.  Thus new process controls on
boards must be implemented.
B.  Board Accountability
Outside of the classic weak owners/strong managers paradigm of Anglo-
American ownership structures, corporate board theory frequently stops short
of addressing key issues such as the factors that would require corporate boards
to take into account the existence of gender inequality and other problems.
Yet there are precedents in other developed economies where corporate boards
are required to act in the best interests of the corporation, taking into account
shareholders, employees, and the public good.  Germany’s co-determination
model is just one example.  Anglo-American theorists suggest that share-
holders are vulnerable to co-determination boards because they are worker-
dominated and create managerial opportunism in bypassing the board.
However, what has not really been explored is the fact that the powerful
alliance of blockholders and managers in Germany pre-dates statutorily
imposed co-determination and that worker participation on boards was a
response to this alliance.  The fact that there has not been a shift in the power
balance does not necessarily mean that the model could not effectively
respond to concerns regarding effective board oversight, perhaps in com-
bination with the development of a fiduciary responsibility of directors and
officers to act in the best interests of the corporation in regard to the interests
of shareholders, workers, and other investors.
Other models now being developed include notions of the director as a
neutral referee and directors as trustees of diverse beneficiaries with an
investment in the corporation.71  Lynne Dallas has proposed a relational cor-
porate board model in which value is added to the corporation by extending
board memberships, thereby improving access to advice and information,
monitoring and direction, and providing legitimacy through representation
by community. 72  Dallas points to empirical data that suggests that the board
is an effective means of acquiring resources, reducing environmental uncer-
tainty, and ensuring that decision making takes account of the context in which
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the corporation operates.  She favours a board relationship that is not depen-
dent on efficient markets, equity ownership, or equal bargaining strength
among stakeholders.  This theory of relational boards recognizes that there
are skills and resources that stakeholders can contribute and diverse decision
making approaches that could enhance corporate decision making through
representation by gender, by race, and by class of interest.73
Importing feminist norms into cost/benefit analyses engaged in by the
corporate board could work to recast how corporate decisions are costed,
including costs to workers, to communities and to the environment.  Such
board reform, in conjunction with shareholder activism, could encourage
investors to move their capital to these corporations, ultimately sending
a signal to the market regarding how corporations should engage in
cost/benefit analysis, and how they should value diverse inputs.  Relating
back to the earlier discussion of how costs are measured, corporate decision
makers should ensure not only compliance with the law, but with the spirit of
laws aimed at elimination of gender and racial discrimination.  Cheryl Wade
has observed that the lack of board oversight of human rights compliance
has led to enormous costs to investors from loss of civil anti-discrimination
suits, citing Texaco and Coca-Cola as examples.74  She suggests that racially
toxic corporate activity is economically costly in terms of harm to employ-
ees, loss of goodwill, cost of fighting civil suits and in monetary losses to the
corporate balance sheet.  If the board is responsible for complying with
public law, there may be enhanced socially responsible corporate behaviour.
A recent Canadian survey found that 72% of those surveyed wanted
corporate executives to take social responsibility issues into account in cor-
porate decision making.75  This is particularly interesting because, unlike the
United States or the European Union, the issue of corporate responsibility
has not been visible as a topic of public discourse or as a topic of corporate
legal scholarship in Canada.  While the survey results are encouraging in
terms of a growing awareness of the influence of corporate decision makers
on social and economic activity, it is unclear how this can translate into
effective investor preference expression.  A couple of short-term challenges
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are how to place the issue of women’s equality on the agenda of investor
preferences and how to import notions of collectivism into the corporate para-
digm, so that capital will flow to corporations committed to decision making
that properly assesses all interests and not merely short-term return on
capital.  Current investor education is aimed at the prevention of fraud and
enhancement of investing skills, with little or no attention to skills that
would allow investors to invest based on their own social, economic, and
political preferences.76
Lynne Dallas has observed that “exit,” as a signal of market confidence in
corporate activities, can send uncertain messages through imperfect markets
to managers, particularly in regard to issues of social responsibility or
environmental harms resulting from corporate actions.77  She suggests that
shareholder voting could provide shareholders with an opportunity for
wider expression of preferences, ultimately enhancing the accountability of
managers.  In this context, voting on social responsibility issues is prefer-
able to exit and may provide a more effective means of communicating
investor preferences to corporate directors and officers.  Dallas suggests
that one could develop a system of voting rights based on the concept of
constituency.  She observes that where voice instead of exit is effectively
used, the power imbalances between investors and managers would shift.
Building on that notion, “constituency” would need to include voice by
women and voice by others affected by the decisions of the corporate board.
Otherwise, the distributional consequences that occur now would become
more aggravated.
C.  Gender in Other Corporate Governance Regimes
 As capital moves outward, one question is whether there is another
governance model in which gender has been adequately addressed.  Other
governance models include those promoted by international organizations
and stakeholder oriented models such as those found in Japan and Germany.
The optimal principles for corporate governance currently being promoted
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
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the World Bank, and other international organizations fail to deal with
gender issues in relation to the corporation.78  For example, transparency, a
key governance requirement, refers to transparency in capital structure,
accountability mechanisms, and prohibitions on insider trading and self-
dealing transactions.  Transparency requirements allow shareholders to
monitor the use of their equity capital.  With the growing diversity of capital
structures, there are new risks which mean that transparency as an objective
needs further conceptual development.  In jurisdictions where there has been
a culture of disclosure, as in the United States, there have been recent, very
notable failures in transparency.  However, transparency could also address
human rights and environmental concerns, and the positioning and treatment
of women within the corporation.79  While this is important, absent the power
to act on these disclosures, either internally, through exercise of corporate
power, or externally through effective use of exit or voice, transparency is a
laudable but inadequate measure in itself.
Disclosure is only one component of governance.  It is aimed exclusively
at protection of equity owners; it assumes that equity owners receive
information on a timely and accurate basis allowing them to act on their
preferences.  Disclosure favours the current inequitable and gendered distri-
bution of property, and it may exacerbate women’s current vulnerability as
equity investors themselves, as they are less likely to be able to withstand
rapidly fluctuating market prices.  Moreover, transparency as the key tool for
corporate social responsibility assumes that with meaningful disclosure, share-
holders would act on preferences that were more socially responsible, rather
than short-term value maximization.
Even those systems considered primarily stakeholder driven suffer from a
gendered view of the corporation.  One example is Japan’s corporate gover-
nance system, characterized by a system of cross-holdings, with Keiretsus,
corporate groups, and powerful social and cultural relationships as a mecha-
nism to foster corporate community.80  The structure of ownership and debt
historically resulted in little dependence on capital markets.  While this led
to underdevelopment of securities markets and minority shareholder protec-
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tion, the bank-centered model also tempered the pure shareholder wealth
maximization model, giving rise to corporate governance norms that empha-
size protection of employee and creditor interests, considered at least as
important as shareholder interests.81  The bank-centered model included a
normative conception of long-time employment and incentives to invest in
industry and firm specific human capital, in turn generating high loyalty and
buy-in to the objectives of enhancing productivity and both employee and
shareholder wealth maximization.82
However, this has been a highly gendered view of the recognition of
employees’ contributions to the firm.  Japanese laws do not adequately pro-
tect working women from discrimination.83  Women are not given access to
many jobs that provide long-term employment assurances, because there
continues to be deeply imbedded norms dictating that women must make a
choice between career and marriage/child bearing.84  Sexual harassment,
discrimination in wages, and hiring based on age and physical appearance
continue to inform corporate hiring practices.85  Recent laws addressing sexual
harassment and equal opportunity in the workplace may begin to remedy
these problems, but they inadequately address preventive strategies, broad
equitable remedies and more systemic change.86  If the Anglo-American
experience in anti-discrimination laws is an indication, the existence of new
laws will not fully address deeply imbedded cultural views of women as sexual
objects and/or mothers.87  Women in Japanese corporations face many of the
same barriers and power relations as women encounter in Anglo-American
corporate structures.
Interestingly, the value structure of Japanese corporations that has some
intuitive appeal, such as its communitarian goals, collective process, and the
non-adversarial resolution of disputes through social relations and collective
process, arguably align with feminist notions of collaboration.  These struc-
tures require enormous time commitments outside of working hours.  Thus
these structures often conflict with women’s caregiving obligations frequently
forcing women in Japan to choose between time commitments to the corpo-
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ration and mothering.88  Women are not yet viewed as valuable participants
in decision making, and continue to face enormous barriers to accessing board
positions and thus to influencing corporate governance.   While these changes
are slowly being addressed, they highlight the fact that non-aggressive and
more co-operative models do not necessarily include women’s voices.
Other jurisdictions may have generated corporate models that are more
inclusive of women’s interests and investments in the firm; however, there is
a serious lack of empirical data in this respect.  In countries with co-determi-
nation models of corporate governance, such as Germany, human capital
contributions are recognized and valued.  German works councils, situated
at the production level, have the stated objectives of working collectively for
the good of both the enterprise and the employees, imposing a model of
collaboration and resolution of differences.89  The gender implications of
this and similar models, however, need further consideration.
D.  Cross-Cultural Accountability
The notion of “equitable treatment” of shareholders or other interests
differs normatively in different corporate cultures and thus there is a need for
development of a cross-cultural theory to inform corporate governance
norms.90  Anthropological definitions of culture include factors such as
social inequality, the relationship of the individual to the group, the social
implications of gender, and dealing with uncertainty or risk capacity.91  Much
further cross-cultural collaborative research is needed to fully understand these
influences.  Steven Ramirez has suggested that duty of loyalty principles
should be extended to require corporate officers to recognize and value
racial and other types of diversity, because powerful business arguments for
diversity have frequently been ignored by corporate decision makers.92  This
is still the case, notwithstanding the move to global capital markets requiring
U.S. corporations to increasingly deal with multi-cultural and multi-racial
constituencies of capital investors, workers, and consumers.93  As with women,
the voices of racial minorities are not represented on corporate boards and
the value of their contributions are not visible or properly accounted for.
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Women of colour are doubly disadvantaged in terms of how the corporation
fails to value their contributions to productive activity.
Diversity can enhance corporate governance by: generating new ideas and
new approaches to decision making and corporate activity; engaging in more
rigorous monitoring and elimination of all forms of discrimination; imple-
menting effective complaint resolution mechanisms for discrimination;
and assessing managerial performance through the lens of diversity.94  More-
over, the representation of women on corporate boards and at all levels of
the corporate hierarchy could work to eliminate insidious forms of sexual
harassment that appear to be pervasive in most corporate law regimes.  As
Caroline Forell has observed, men view sex in the work place as less injuri-
ous than women do and as a consequence, reasonable standards imposed by
managers are those of the “reasonable man.”95  By changing the decision
makers and importing feminist approaches to the elimination of harassment,
the corporation could prevent the harms caused by sexual and racial harass-
ment.  Elimination of these harms would not only enhance the quality of
women’s working lives, but also ultimately enhance enterprise value through
lower employee turnover and prevention of costly liability for failure to
maintain a harassment free environment.  This is one example of how
changing the face, literally, of the corporate board, could enhance corporate
governance.
Until some of the costs that are currently not accounted for, such as social
and economic harms created by corporate restructuring, sexual harassment,
gender and racial inequality, and the full costs of tort harms, are allocated to
corporations and their decision makers in terms of statutory and/or judicially
imposed liability, this shift in the normative paradigm is unlikely to occur.
Moreover, implementation of these changes alone will not address the highly
gendered way in which corporate decision makers engage in decisions, value
the contributions of women, and assess costs and benefits to particular
constituencies implicated in the corporation.
Claire Moore Dickerson observes that corporate social responsibility is a
norm, not a truth.  Due to globalization, all those affected by corporate
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action, including the larger community, define the norm and thus it is no
longer merely defined by corporate actors or the larger commercial commu-
nity.96  She suggests that corporate norms have thus been codified through an
approximation of democracy and that human rights norms have a claim to
legitimacy, bolstered by checks on abuse by either the majority or the minor-
ity.  Using examples where public pressure based on human rights norms has
altered corporate conduct of multi-national enterprises, Dickerson analyses
“third generation” human rights that are collectivist rights.  While unenforce-
able in the United States, internationally there is greater respect for
observance of the international treaty system that supports human rights
norms.  She suggests that this treaty system, while imperfect, mirrors
globally representative democracy and works to contain abuses through its
international reach, in turn shaping corporate responsibility norms.  Dickerson
observes that while the system for identifying and codifying human rights is
imperfect, it works toward enhanced participation of stakeholders, and that
human rights norms describe how society wishes the allocation of resources.97
Global capital markets and multi-national enterprises also provide an oppor-
tunity to compare the manner in which gender issues have been dealt with
under different corporate law regimes.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are both public law and private law aspects to corporate governance,
and recent scholarship has made more explicit a number of the operating
assumptions in Anglo-American regulation of securities, corporate activity,
and protection of equity capital investors.  Within that recognition, the
inherent tension between the public and private law aspects is evident.  On
the one hand, regulatory reforms are sought to facilitate the global move-
ment of capital by ensuring protection of equity interests, particularly
foreign capital and minority investors, in terms of recognition and enforce-
ment of property rights.  Regulation is also sought in terms of importing
international accounting and auditing standards to enhance protection of
financial institutions and other investors.  On the other hand, deregulation is
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sought to “free up” labour markets and to facilitate the movement of capital
by investors, to encourage “free trade” and to generally discourage regula-
tion that inhibits investment.  Thus, regulation is sought to facilitate the
global movement of equity capital while the same considerations are not part
of the debate for human capital and non-capital investors, and in particular,
women in their multiple roles.
The underlying assumption is that the optimal approach to a globally
integrated economy is to maximize efficiency by facilitating the ability of
corporations, investors, and lenders to compete in global capital markets and
enhance return to equity investors.   While there is no doubt that such compe-
tition is a prerequisite for continued economic growth, it casts the paradigm
too narrowly.  This is illustrated by the definition of efficiency discussed
above and the operating assumption that efficiency is enhanced by exter-
nalizing costs wherever possible.  These costs have clear gender biases,
disproportionately affecting women in their diverse roles.  In turn, these
externalities raise the issue as to why those bearing the costs do not have
their interests considered in these corporate decisions.  Thus, only costs
internal to the corporation are measured in determining efficiency, primarily
through the measure of return to shareholders.
A model that suggests that capital, if given free movement and protection
of property rights will move to the highest use, ignores a number of market
and other realities.  It completely bypasses the debate regarding why prop-
erty in this context is a higher valued commodity than human capital or other
investments, or why “commodities” themselves should be the driving force
in global development.  It bypasses any discussion as to whether social
welfare maximization, the core objective of classical economics, needs to be
recast to look at a more equitable distribution of wealth in order to redress
historical inequities.   It also bypasses any discussion regarding the maleness
of corporate behaviour and the caring, innovative, and collective approaches
that women can offer.  These are deeply embedded normative notions that
have distributional consequences without ever being explicitly acknowledged.
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While enterprise wealth maximization may be the appropriate interim
model for the corporation, it must be accompanied by a greatly strengthened
public law framework in securities law, labour law, human rights protection,
consumer protection, environmental law, and a range of other enforceable
standards that temper the wealth seeking objectives of the corporation.   Given
current trends to devolve state activity to private actors and shifts from
domestic to global decision making, this is a sizeable project.   It will require
energy on multiple fronts and more fundamental thinking about our current
gendered view of corporate law before any substantive change will occur.
When my daughter’s television program was cancelled, the viewing
public lost access to an important set of voices in the equality discourse, but
it did not lose her energy and skills.  Her recent film on breast cancer sur-
vivors, her “Abode” project where she is working with authors to raise
awareness and funds for homeless people, and yes, even a current film project
interviewing feminist corporate legal scholars that will serve as a future
teaching tool in corporate law courses, are evidence of the indefatigable
energy of young feminists to use whatever available tools and resources in
their quest for equality and justice.  Collectively, as corporate practitioners,
legal scholars, business people, and community members, we also need to
make a contribution where we are able.  While more fundamental change is
highly unlikely in the short term, we need to utilize existing legal and
theoretical tools in a way that begins to recognize and perhaps eventually
remedy gender biases in corporate law and governance practice.
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